What's in the best interest of the US: maintain current military presence in Europe, or redeploy troops to other regions?

In 1956 I made the decision to join France and Britain in the Suez operation against Egypt. The strategic window provided by Anglo-French interests aligned with Israel's security need. This taught me that military presence and political commitment are the same thing. When American troops are stationed in Europe, they do more than provide defense capability. They signal to adversaries that an attack on European allies would be an attack on America itself. The physical presence of forces creates the automatic involvement that turns a paper treaty into a credible deterrent.

Any redeployment signals strategic priorities and invites probing by competitors. When President Eisenhower forced us to withdraw from Sinai in 1957, every Arab leader understood that American pressure had real limits and that our French alliance had real value. Visible military presence is the difference between an alliance and a diplomatic statement.

Ben-Gurion is right about credibility, but he understands alliance management from the position of a small state seeking protection. I governed a medium state that was both protected and constrained by American presence. In 1979 I drove through NATO's dual-track decision against massive domestic opposition precisely because visible American commitment in Europe was the foundation of our security architecture. The deployment of Pershing II missiles on German soil made clear that European and American security were operationally inseparable.

The structure of deterrence requires this presence. Soviet planners understood that any conventional attack on Western Europe would automatically involve American forces stationed here. This removed the decision-point that might otherwise tempt an adversary to probe alliance resolve through limited action.

Schmidt's NATO experience occurred during a bipolar world where the Soviet Union was the single rival. Today's strategic environment is multipolar and dynamic. American military commitments in Europe constrain American responses elsewhere — precisely the pattern intelligent adversaries will exploit. In the 1970s I observed that American overextension in Vietnam created opportunities for other powers. The same logic applies to current deployments.

My doctrine was "hide your strength, bide your time" — wait for the stronger power to overcommit before revealing your hand. European deployment forces America to maintain expensive infrastructure while competitors build capability quietly. Every division stationed in Europe is a division not available for Indo-Pacific contingencies.

The deeper principle is resource allocation under strategic competition. Fixed commitments become predictable vulnerabilities. America's European presence tells every competitor exactly where significant American forces will be positioned, allowing adversaries to plan around known constraints.

Deng's analysis treats NATO as American overextension, but this misunderstands what the alliance provides to America itself. During the Cold War, American presence in Europe was not charity — it was the mechanism that prevented European neutrality or accommodation with the Soviet Union. The troops were not just protecting us; they were ensuring that European industrial capacity and geographic position remained aligned with American interests rather than against them.

In 1983 I supported the deployment of American cruise missiles despite massive domestic opposition precisely because the presence of American forces made Soviet intimidation impossible. The alternative to American presence is not European independence — it is European vulnerability to pressure from whoever fills the vacuum.

Today's strategic competition with China makes European alliance even more valuable to America. Europe represents democratic industrial capacity, technology partnerships, and geographic position that America cannot afford to lose to competitors.