Yes, governments should ban PFAS, but with transition timelines that fund alternatives development.
The $10.3 billion settlement proves liability law failed to prevent contamination before it spread. Roosevelt and Kautilya anchor protection in state duty: clean water cannot wait for market corrections. Schmidt's transition planning addresses the 460,000 chemical workers and essential PFAS functions in medical devices.
The council splits on speed versus economic disruption, not on whether bans are necessary.
PFAS contamination follows the same extractive pattern as colonial exploitation.
Corporate polluters externalise environmental costs while privatising profits. This is colonial logic applied to chemistry. When 3M pays $10.3 billion in settlements, they admit liability while continuing production. In 1989 I fought President Moi's plan to build a monument in Uhuru Park because public land belongs to the public, not to those who profit from its destruction. The same principle applies to water systems. Communities that bear the health costs of PFAS contamination had no voice in decisions to use these chemicals.
Markets price risk better than regulators can anticipate it.
Maathai's colonial framing misses the efficiency question. The $10.3 billion settlement demonstrates that liability law works. Companies that cause damage pay for it. This creates the right incentives without requiring bureaucrats to predict which of 10,000 chemicals might be harmful. In 1970 I argued that corporate social responsibility is to increase profits within the rules of the game. When the rules include liability for contamination, profit-seeking automatically incorporates environmental costs. Banning PFAS before alternatives exist destroys value without eliminating risk.
Clean water is a human right that requires protective institutions.
Friedman's liability approach protects property, not people. Rights mean nothing if we wait for damage to occur before acting. When I chaired the UN Commission on Human Rights, we included the right to health in Article 25 because survival cannot depend on market calculations. The European Union's PFAS restrictions in 2023 demonstrate that democratic institutions can act on scientific evidence before irreversible harm spreads. Children drinking contaminated water today cannot sue for cancers they may develop in thirty years.
Regulation without alternatives planning is policy failure.
Roosevelt is right about protective obligations, but immediate prohibition creates more problems than it solves. During the 1973 oil embargo, I learned that energy security requires managed transitions, not sudden cuts. PFAS serve essential functions in electronics, medical devices, and infrastructure. A responsible ban includes timelines for alternatives development and support for affected workers and industries. The EU's approach recognises this. Germany's chemical sector employs 460,000 people. Their jobs matter as much as water quality.
States must protect subjects from harmful products regardless of economic interests.
Schmidt underestimates state capacity. In the Arthashastra I documented systematic market regulation: standardised weights, anti-adulteration laws, severe penalties for merchants who sold contaminated goods. A king who allows poison in the water supply fails his primary obligation. The technical complexity that intimidates modern governments is irrelevant. When scientific evidence shows persistent toxicity, the state's duty is clear. Prevention costs less than treating widespread illness. PFAS manufacturers had decades to develop alternatives and chose profits over safety.
Where the council converges: Current liability and regulatory systems have failed to prevent widespread PFAS contamination.
Where it divides: Whether comprehensive prohibition or managed transition better protects both public health and economic stability.
What only the policymaker can resolve: The timeline for PFAS phase-out and the level of state support for alternatives development.