How can we create long term peace in Libanon
Lebanon needs international partners who can fund state rebuilding while deterring Iranian interference.
Ben-Gurion's demand for disarmament first ignores Lebanon's collapsed state capacity after 2019. Sirleaf and Adenauer both rebuilt failed states by accepting international oversight in exchange for resources and security guarantees. Schmidt warns that Lebanon's multiple dependencies let external powers manipulate domestic actors through competing funding streams.
The council splits on sequencing: security first versus simultaneous reconstruction through international integration.
Confidence summary: High confidence that current Lebanese state structure cannot deliver peace; moderate confidence on optimal sequencing of security and governance reforms.
1. The core argument
Lebanon's peace problem is not a conflict to be resolved but a state to be rebuilt. With Hezbollah controlling 100,000 rockets and the government unable to pay basic salaries after the 2019 banking collapse, Lebanon lacks the fundamental prerequisite for peace: a monopoly on legitimate force within recognized borders. The country has become what political scientists call a "phantom state," where formal institutions exist but effective authority lies elsewhere. Any peace framework must grapple with this structural reality rather than treating Lebanon as a normal state temporarily experiencing conflict. The question is not whether to rebuild Lebanese sovereignty, but whether security or governance comes first in that rebuilding process.
2. How each member frames it
David Ben-Gurion draws on his decision to sink the Altalena arms ship in 1948, killing 16 Jewish fighters to establish state authority over independent militias. He sees Lebanon's eighteen-year failure to implement Resolution 1701 as proof that negotiated disarmament cannot work when the state lacks enforcement capacity. Ben-Gurion would accept significant international pressure on Israel to withdraw from occupied territories, but only after Hezbollah's arsenal is physically dismantled, not promised away in agreements.
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf reframes disarmament demands as premature when the state cannot provide alternative services. After Liberia's civil war, she had to negotiate with warlords who controlled electricity, courts, and local security while simultaneously building parallel government capacity. She argues that Lebanon's government cannot credibly demand Hezbollah's withdrawal from the border while depending on Hezbollah's social services to maintain domestic legitimacy.
Konrad Adenauer sees Lebanon as needing the same "Westintegration" that saved post-war Germany: accepting sovereignty constraints in exchange for credible security guarantees and reconstruction resources. He would trade Lebanese neutrality for NATO-style protection and Marshall Plan-scale investment, recognizing that true sovereignty sometimes requires strategic dependence on reliable partners rather than formal independence with multiple competing patrons.
Helmut Schmidt warns that Lebanon's multiple dependencies have made it a proxy battlefield rather than a sovereign actor. He argues that Iranian funding for Hezbollah, Saudi support for Sunni groups, Syrian control of electricity supply, and Western aid for the government create competing chains of loyalty that prevent any coherent national policy. Schmidt would prioritize diversifying Lebanon's economic relationships to reduce leverage points for external manipulation.
Albert Hirschman notes that Lebanon's economic collapse has made emigration harder for middle-class families, potentially increasing domestic pressure on all armed actors including Hezbollah. He argues for international aid that makes staying more attractive than leaving, creating incentives for Lebanese citizens to demand accountability from both government and non-state actors rather than simply exiting the country.
3. Where the council agrees
All members recognize that Lebanon's current institutional structure cannot sustain peace because effective authority is divided among competing actors answerable to different external sponsors. They agree that the 2019 banking collapse fundamentally altered Lebanese politics by destroying the government's capacity to provide basic services or pay salaries. The council also concurs that international involvement is unavoidable given Lebanon's geographic position and resource constraints, but that current international efforts lack both the scale and coherence needed for success. Most significantly, they agree that resolution 1701's failure after eighteen years demonstrates that negotiated agreements without enforcement mechanisms cannot overcome structural power imbalances between state and non-state actors.
4. Where the council splits
The fundamental disagreement centers on whether security must precede governance reconstruction or whether both can proceed simultaneously through international integration. Ben-Gurion insists that disarming Hezbollah is the necessary first step because no state-building can succeed while an alternative authority controls territory and weapons. Adenauer, Sirleaf, Schmidt, and Hirschman argue that demanding disarmament before rebuilding state capacity asks Lebanon to destroy the only functioning institutions in many areas. They contend that international partners must provide both security guarantees and reconstruction resources simultaneously, accepting that this requires unprecedented coordination among competing external powers with divergent interests in Lebanon's future.
5. For a policymaker to decide on
Whether to condition international aid and security cooperation on Hezbollah's immediate disarmament or to provide support for state rebuilding while accepting Hezbollah's continued presence during a transition period. The first approach risks prolonging state collapse if disarmament fails; the second risks legitimizing an armed non-state actor that has shown no willingness to subordinate itself to government authority. This choice cannot be made on technical grounds alone but depends on whether policymakers believe sustainable peace requires uncompromising state sovereignty or can accommodate power-sharing with non-state actors during an extended transition.