Should the EU tighten its partnership with China in light of the deteriorating relations?
Europe should deepen institutional unity first, then engage China economically while building independent strategic capabilities — but whether this balanced approach remains viable depends on forces beyond European control.
Adenauer insists European institutional unity must precede any China engagement to prevent divide-and-rule tactics, while Schmidt advocates strategic autonomy through economic partnership with defense preparedness. Lee Kuan Yew argues Europe can make itself useful to both superpowers simultaneously, and Deng emphasizes China's continued focus on development over confrontation, with Sun Tzu recommending strategic patience to avoid forcing binary choices.
The council cannot resolve whether great power competition will ultimately compel Europe to choose sides despite its preference for strategic autonomy.
Confidence summary: The council reaches tactical agreement but fundamental disagreement on whether strategic autonomy can survive great power competition.
The core argument
When Konrad Adenauer chose Western integration over neutrality in 1949, he faced the identical dilemma Europe confronts today: engage both superpowers and risk manipulation, or commit fully to one and sacrifice options. His answer — sovereignty through binding institutional commitments — illuminates China policy seventy-five years later. Europe fragments at its peril. Individual member states negotiating separately with Beijing will be systematically defeated by Chinese divide-and-rule tactics, just as separate German negotiations with Moscow would have been exploited during the Cold War.
But Adenauer's institutional solution requires a choice his successors reject. Helmut Schmidt's energy diversification with Soviet gas — maintained despite American pressure — suggests Europe can avoid binary thinking. The challenge: Schmidt's détente operated within clear Cold War boundaries that no longer exist. Today's competition sprawls across technology, finance, and governance models in ways that make partial engagement far more complex.
How each member frames it
Konrad Adenauer sees this through his 1949 integration choice — Europe must deepen institutional unity before engaging China or risk being divided and conquered by Beijing's bilateral pressure tactics.
Helmut Schmidt reframes the question as preserving strategic autonomy through selective engagement — accepting Chinese investment while strengthening European capabilities independently of both American and Chinese preferences.
Lee Kuan Yew views this as Singapore's dual engagement strategy scaled up — making Europe useful to both powers for different reasons while building capabilities neither can threaten.
Deng Xiaoping frames European suspicions as American-manufactured problems — China's development focus creates natural partnership opportunities if Europe rejects ideological competition.
Sun Tzu sees optimal strategy requiring deception from both sides — China appearing less threatening while deepening economic ties, Europe engaging economically while preparing for confrontation.
Where the council agrees
The most striking consensus emerges around European institutional unity as prerequisite for any China strategy. Even members who disagree on engagement levels accept that fragmented European approaches invite exploitation by both superpowers. Schmidt's strategic autonomy requires Adenauer's institutional foundation. Lee Kuan Yew's dual engagement demands unified European negotiating positions. Sun Tzu's strategic patience assumes coherent counterpart capabilities.
The council also agrees that pure confrontation serves neither European nor Chinese interests. Deng's development priorities align with European economic needs in green technology and manufacturing. Complete decoupling imposes costs that both sides can avoid through selective partnership. Even Adenauer's institutional deepening aims to strengthen Europe for engagement, not isolation.
Finally, all members recognize that American pressure for binary choices threatens European strategic autonomy. Washington's demand for complete alignment serves American industrial policy rather than European prosperity. This creates space for European-Chinese cooperation if both sides manage the relationship carefully.
What would change this verdict
Chinese military action against Taiwan would force the binary choice Europe hopes to avoid, making continued economic partnership politically impossible regardless of European institutional unity. Alternatively, sustained American economic incentives that exceed Chinese partnership benefits could make alignment more attractive than autonomy.